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Uncovering political reasoning among young Danish and Norwegian citizens. Exploring the relationship between identity, forms of rationality and emotions
Ass. Prof. Trond Solhaug and Ass. Prof. Niels Nørgaard Kristensen
Introduction  
The very idea about democracies is public participation in elections, decision-making and/or public engagement. The democratic participation distributes power among ordinary people and serves to legitimize decisions in public affairs and is a vital characteristic of a political culture.”The term ’political culture’ refers to the specifically political orientations – attitudes toward the political system and its various parts, and attitudes toward the role of the self in the system” (Almond & Verba, 1963:12).  A political culture is among several aspects characterized by the forms and level of participation and particularly how individuals regard themselves as active political citizens. Participation, either voter turnout or other forms of public involvement is regarded as a barometer of the quality of democracy in a country and serves to characterize the political culture in a democracy (Diamond & Morlino, 2005). The political culture of the two countries Norway and Denmark is the context of the present study of how young people reason about their political involvement. The Scandinavian political cultures are characterized by high levels of trust and participation (voter turnout) (Newton, 2008), (Blais, 2008:623).  The public debate is free as well as other forms of organizational or individual participation. However, both countries have over the last decades experienced immigration from Western, and particularly non-western countries. It turns out that immigrants participate less than the Norwegian and Danish majority population. For some immigrant groups it can be said that they occupy a new lower class (Østerud, 2007) (Bhatti Y. & Hansen K.M. 2010).  Research has pointed out a number of politically alienating mechanisms among immigrant youths (Solhaug, 2011).  Despite alienating mechanisms and a vulnerable situation in a new country immigrant youths consider themselves capable and committed to political participation. Studies have revealed important insights into how immigrant youth consider themselves politically passive but at the same time views themselves as politically active in certain contexts (Kristensen & Solhaug, 2010). However, closer studies on how immigrant youth reason about politics is needed to understand the dynamics of their political participation. 
Looking more closely at political participation, citizens need to decide about being political on number of matters (Dalton & Klingemann, 2008:9-10). These matters could be almost anything like choosing candidates and parties in elections, deciding on issues and which positions to hold, and choosing the means of political involvement. Citizens approach these decisions in quite different ways. Some may pursue their own personal strategic interests while others actively use cues or values to make their choices of personal involvement. How citizens choose to participate may also vary according to which decision they have to make, to the context of the political involvement or even their mood.  Consequently, we believe that citizens may reach decisions about political involvement quite differently. However, we also acknowledge that citizens may have their preferred ways to reach decisions about politics and particularly their political participation. In this paper we would like to focus on how young immigrant youths decide on political matters by focusing on political rationality. Our research question is: 
What important theoretical elements can be traced in how young immigrant students in Norway and Denmark reason about their political participation? - Toward a model of political reasoning.
A selection of 12 Norwegian and 12 Danish students in two secondary schools were interviewed late fall 2010. We believe that a selection of students across different political cultures makes our findings more valid.  Furthermore, young students in secondary school are in the process of becoming political as they acquire citizen rights to participation during their time in school.  The study of political rationality is highly relevant for the process of political socialization where the school plays a significant role. Political socialization may be regarded as a process where citizens integrate in the present political culture on the one hand and prepare for openness and political change on the other (Sears, 1990:90). 
In order to investigate political reasoning and the possible link between behavior and identities, and the ways in which political identity might relate to emotions and political rationality, we will deploy a theoretical framework for the task, which is rather simple and yet highly complex. It is drawing on a broad theoretical perspective from symbolic interactionism combined with theories from psychology and other behavioral sciences, political science and the neo-institutionalism of March & Olsen. Theoretically we will apply different forms of political rationality; first we focus on instrumental rationality as outlined by instrumentalist and consequentialist political approaches, which according to Habermas are prominent in the liberal form of democracy (Habermas, 1995).  Instrumental rationality corresponds to “the logic of consequentiality” according to March and Olsen. Second, we emphasize value rationality which is prominent in participatory democracy (Habermas, 1995). This corresponds to “the logic of appropriateness” by March and Olsen.  Third, we will apply the notion of emotions. No one has yet, according to our present knowledge, tied the notion of emotion to political identity analysis. It will, however, we believe, prove to be valuable for the empirical investigation of the study, as it adds attention to micro level processes often lacking in common political science analysis. We think though, that – in general – the profound micro perspective of political psychology, as well as the macro perspective of political science, typical for election research and political behavior, don’t usually talk well together. The combination of both perspectives are, however, needed for a fuller philosophical conception of political agency.
Situating the study - previous research
A’ word in title search’ of ‘political rationality’ in ISI web of knowledge social science citation index reveals 107 hits from 1970 to present.  A large majority of these studies focus on political rationality either as an analytical tool for explaining political behavior or study rationality in a concrete political context. Sullivan et al emphasize that research in political psychology has shifted from a focus on personality and politics to political attitudes and beliefs and then to political cognition and information processing (Sullivan, Rahn, & Tudolph, 2002:27). Important early contributions to political reasoning and development are (Adelson & O'Neal, 1966), (Adelson, 1971).  Works on political cognition, schema and development highly relevant for social studies teaching have been carried out by Torney-Purta (Torney-Purta, 1989),(Torney-Purta, 1992), (Torney-Purta, 1994), (Byrnes & Torney-Purta, 1995)
The studies of political rationality have been prominent within the field and rationality models as one of key developments (Sullivan, et al., 2002:27).  Thus political cognition and information processing are considered to be one of the latest developments of political psychology (Sullivan, et al., 2002). Taber reviews research on information processing and discusses the relationship between the individual and public opinion formation (Taber, 2003). We argue that the study of political rationalities will reveal how people use an individual as well as a larger social perspective when they reflect upon their political involvement.  Forms of rationality seem to be dependent on context which implies that different models may apply to various contexts (Sullivan, et al., 2002). We argue that it may be studied as a general phenomenon among individuals and that findings of predominant rationality is important and likely to occur in many occasions. Richard Lau offers an overview of rationality models of political decision-making (Lau, 2003). Rational choice models as well as modes of imperfect information are offered. However, particularly emotions, or on the whole non-consequentialist or non-cognitive rationalities, which are analytical categories in the present study, are not dealt with here.  Despite the fact that both authors comment upon cognitive processes where rationality seem to be an important aspect, they do not reveal research which explicitly deals with forms of rationality. An important study is carried out by Kjetil Børhaug.  In his study of how young adolescents find meaning in political participation he focuses on participation as instrumental pursuit of preferences.  He found that a majority of students find participation meaningful to the extent that they as citizens are able to influence the outcome of politics (Børhaug, 2010:132).
Theory 
Citizenship and political rationality 
We want to tie our analysis of political rationality to a theoretical framework of citizenship. Despite the fact that political participation is axiomatic to democracy, its valued rather differently depending on the approach to models of democracy (Habermas, 1995), (Schuck, 2002), (Dagger, 2002), (Delanty, 2002). In Schumpeters liberal version of democracy participation in elections in competition over power is most important.  In this political context individual interest and instrumental rationality is prevailing. Carole Pateman and other participatory theorists argue that active citizen involvement at all levels not only is vital to democracy, but a goal in itself, which serve to educate people (Pateman, 1970); see also (Mansbridge, 1999).  Strong awareness of a larger collective and value rationality are important aspects of participatory democracy. Habermas on his part emphasizes public deliberation as a particularly important form of participation to enlighten issues and form opinions in the public debate over issues  (Habermas, 1995). Deliberative democracy is embedded in communicative rationality (Habermas, 1984). In other words, the way people reason over politics, pursue their own interest and reach decisions, may be quite different.  People may prefer to act individually and try to maximize their personal interest as well as preferring to see their interest in a larger perspective on society. Peoples´ information processing may therefore reflect a specific approach to the role of citizen and also a specific perception of democracy.  The study of political rationalities may in a larger perspective of citizenship roles prove to be an important approach to the study also reflecting how people perceive their role in democracy. 
Political identity 
Much thinking in relation to identity theory points back to structural symbolic interactionism (Stryker 1980). Two features that are particularly important in structural symbolic interaction are society and self. Society is viewed as a stable and orderly structure as reflected in the patterned behaviour within and between social actors. While actors are creating social structure, they are also receiving feedback from the social structure that influences their behaviour. In this way, actors are always embedded in the very social structure that they are simultaneously creating (Stryker 1980). In identity theory, an identity is a set of meanings applied to the self in a specific social role or situation. It defines, what it means being the one in that role or situation (Stryker 1980; Burke & Tully 1977). This line of thinking is very much reflected in March & Olsen and in their notion of “logic of appropriateness”.  Political identity can be seen as a subset of social identity. The competing social identities offered by superordinate (e.g. one´s national identity) and subgroup (e.g. ethnic, religious, gender) identities interact complexly for optimal distinctiveness (Brewer & Conover 2009). We consider political identity to be important for how people choose to deal with politics and consequently also for their reasoning and basic rationality. We see political identity as how citizens understand and represent themselves in relation to the field of politics. Still, political identity is a somewhat mixed and ambiguous concept, as political identity formation processes often involve double movements. For instance, it often signifies an attempt to articulate membership or belonging, while at the same time it involves desires to delimit affairs, or to express involvement as well as demarcations on certain issues. Identity involves the process of defining us, typically in opposition to them, holding different interests and values. Without the adversarial component, Gamson (2009) argues, the potential target of collective will most likely remain an abstraction, like in the case of hunger, disease or pollution.  Identity does not dictate rationalities – but surely adds direction and level to them. Consequently, identity gives the reasoning direction and has a generative capability in political involvement. We assume that perhaps especially immigrants and second-generation immigrants often are caught between committing to values representing a traditional Muslim world and norms of democratic participation and citizenship. Studying these themes in the context of upper secondary schools is important, as schools might be viewed as a political arena and thus stimulates political participation. This context could also turn out to be useful when it comes to analysing the relation between the common affairs and individual interests, which is a point of focus in the theoretical tradition of citizenship. Political participation research narrowly study the participation itself, whereas the introduction of the notion of citizenship ideally leads to a wider conceptualization of democracy by defining citizenship as the sum of both rights, duties, participation and identity (Delanty 2000). 
Earlier on we defined citizenship as entailing a status-side and a praxis-side – or put in another way: a focus on rights (“objective empowerment”) and on identity (“subjective empowerment”). The identity dimension of citizenship enables us to focus on the actual political participation as well as the subjective understanding of the individual as a member of a political community and part taker in democratic processes. We see identity as the sum of our perceptions of self and others and our interpretations and our attempts to match these interpretations to our social and political practices. Political actions presume identities in order to provide direction for actions. Identity is shaped and re-shaped through education, socialization, reflection and interaction. Often this takes place within an institutionalized context that defines the appropriateness of a given situation. We do not act entirely upon our identities but we put them into play within our daily practises.
 Rationalities
In his general model of social action and rationality Habermas, building highly on Weber (1904), differs between an instrumental rationality [zweckrational], value rationality [wertrational] and communicative rationality. Habermas in many respects takes up the common differentiation between a liberal and a republican model of democracy. Whereas a liberal model relies on the structures of market processes, the republican view favors public communication oriented at mutual understanding. In the liberal model the indissoluble pluralism of pre political values and interests entail that political decisions are at best aggregated with equal weight in the political process. In the republican model, on the other hand, politics must be tied to social norms as well as a communicative rationality and the public use of reason (Habermas 1994). 
	Habermas´ work is very much reflected in March & Olsen, who distinguish between two different types of rationalities for action – a ‘logic of consequentiality’ (actors are motivated by the pursuit of interests) and a ‘logic of appropriateness’ (stressing the role of identity, moral considerations, and ‘reasoned obligation’) – and thereby clarify the difference between instrumental and identity-based or rule-based types of action in relation to political institutions (March & Olsen 2000). The distinction can be regarded as a difference between ‘anticipatory’ and ‘conventional’ action. Anticipatory action (which refers to the ‘logic of consequentiality’) is based on what in political theory is called a rational or an ‘exchange’ perspective on political behaviour. It builds on images of a rational agent. At the micro-level it borrows the basic understandings from economic theory (e.g. Downs 1957, Schumpeter 1946). Action, in this theory is instrumentalist and based on calculations of return. In opposition to this approach March & Olsen propose what they call the ‘conventional’ or ‘obligatory’ mode of action (which refers to the ‘logic of appropriateness’). Political action here aims at matching identity to specific situations (March & Olsen 2000). In such an institutional perspective, which is also very indebted to Mead and the symbolic interactionists, political action is primarily seen as driven by socially constructed meanings, roles and rules reflected in identities and institutions: ‘What does a person such as me do in a situation such as this’, as opposed to ‘Which choice of action has the most favourable consequences’? Rational choice and the consequentialistic understanding of political is based on the idea that action is determined by choice, and that choice is the result of evaluations of possible consequences of different alternatives. But even though, March & Olsen argue, this kind of logic captures central aspects of political behavior, political life is full of incidents in which action most likely should be characterized by attempts of matching  situations to given identities (March & Olsen 2000). 
Emotions 
In his analysis of human motivations, Elster informs us, that the 17-century French moralists made a fruitful distinction among interest, reason, and passion. Interest is the pursuit of personal advantage, be it money, fame, power or salvation. Reason is used in relation to the desire to promote the public good rather than private. The passions include emotions as well as other visceral cravings (Elster 2007). The issue of emotion, though, works uncomfortably in most current political analysis, Barbalet claims, among other reasons because it is commonly thought of as a psychological phenomenon and as such a non- (or pre-) political category. But first and foremost this is the case because most political thinking from Karl Marx and Talcott Parson to Mancur Olson assume rational actors (Barbalet 1993). Elster (2007) argues, that emotions matter in their impact on behavior, and we take this to include political behavior. We want, consequently, to incorporate emotions such as love, contempt, indignation, liking, anger, pride, envy, admiration, etc.  into our analysis.
For Stryker (1980) the salience of an identity is related to one´s commitment to this identity. This commitment has both a quantitative dimension (the number of persons that one is connected to through the identity) and a qualitative dimension (the depth of the ties to which one is connected on the basis of the identity). The former points to the fact that the greater the number of people one is tied to through the identity, the stronger the commitment. The latter stresses that the deeper the ties, the greater the commitment to the given identity. So, this pair of notions concerns both the “span” and the “depth” of identity dimensions. The qualitative dimension of commitment also reveals the early recognition of emotion in identity theory (Stets 2009). Stryker has pointed to the intensity of emotions, reminding us that emotions are both a cause and a consequence of commitments (Stryker 2004).
Information 
People have many kinds of knowledge forming their political literacy, like knowledge of political processes and how democracy works; how to get involved in politics and in organizations; how the media work; knowledge of their own role in society; etc. Johnson calls such skills “operative knowledge for civil action” (Johnson 2009), and they are central for the capacity to participate in civic and political processes. We assume that information seeking and processing are vital parts for modern agency and that mass media provide basic tools for participation in democratic public life. Ideally, mass media help to engage citizens in democratic process and to distribute information needed for political action like voting. 
According to Giddens the difference between traditional and modern societies is particularly evident when we regard reflexivity. In all societies (traditional and modern) all humans keep an eye on the reasons for their particular actions. The fact that reflexivity is present in almost all forms of actions makes us regard this concept as a central reason behind information seeking. However, reflexivity in modern societies has a different character than in traditional societies. The daily routines have no clear connection with previous history. Tradition may be justified but only when new knowledge is fairly considered. Doubt is a pervasive feature of everyday life and modernity institutionalizes the principle for radical doubt (Giddens 1991). According to Collero the political implications of existential uncertainty are mixed and a defensive response to “detraditionalization” is to 
…“resort to a fundamentalist stance by asserting truth while at the same time refusing to accept principles of dialogue democracy. This is evident in the growth of religious fundamentalist movements and reactionary political regimes” (Collero 2003: 58).
Modern social life involves that new information is always reflected upon in a constant surveillance of social practice (Giddens, 1997:35). Consequently reflexivity as ongoing cognitive reflections on information and the surveillance of present and future action is an integral part of political participation in present and future action.
Action
We do not in our theoretical framework discriminate systematically between the terms “action”, “behaviour” or “choice”. We prefer simply to use the notion of action (and non-action) to refer to all kinds of political behaviour caused by desires and beliefs of an agent. Political science can in general often be criticized of viewing political action and participation as a narrowly instrumental process. But, over the years, other motifs for participation have been suggested by various scholars. Some point to social norms (Elster 1989; Coleman 1990; March & Olsen 1995), stressing rules, obligations and internalized sense of duties to the wider community. Further, another set of selective incentives are related to “expressive incentives” or “process incentives”, valuing participation in the process itself and the fact that people participate simply in order to express their support or reaffirm their identity (Calvert 2002; Teorell 2006). We take up upon this distinction, but we would, as mentioned, like to add a further last category: namely emotions as a generic incentive driving political action and participation.
The conceptual and theoretical framework proposed here is illustrated in the following figure outlining the basic elements of our analytical approach:
	instrumental rationality (logic of consequentiality)
	value rationality, social norms and rules (logic of appropriateness)
	emotions 
	information






This model will be our conceptional tool in the analysis of the qualitative interview. Finally, we would like to apply Elster´s concept of mechanisms in our analysis in order to explain individual reasoning and behaviour. A mechanism falls somewhere in between the positions of the two extremes – the general law and a nomothetic approach on the one side - and a narrative, idiographic approach on the other side. A mechanism is a specific causal pattern (triggered under generally unknown conditions or with indeterminate consequences; Elster 2008:36). It can be recognized, but not foreseen (Elster (1993).


Method 
A selection of 23 immigrant students from Norwegian and Danish secondary schools were made. Since a matching comparative selection between students in the two countries could not be made due differences in student composition in school, we attemted to maximize the variety of students described in table 1 below
	T1	T2	T3 10	T4 11	T5 12	T6 13	T7 14
Religion	Muslim	Muslim	Budhist 10	Bahai 11	Budhist 12	Budhist13	Muslim14
Age	18	20	18	17	16	18	16
Land	Irak/kurder	Kosovo	Vietnam	Iran	Vietnam	Vietnam	Tunis
Gender	Boy	Boy	Boy	Boy	girl	boy	boy
Time residence 	1999	1999	born	Born	Born 	Born	Born
Citizenship 	Norwegian	Norwegian	Norwegian	Norwegian	Norwegian	Norwegian 	Norwegian

	GS1 15	GS2 16	GS3 17	GS4 18
Religion	Muslim 	Catholic	Orthodocs	Muslim
age	23	23	20	17
Land	Iran	Tanzania	Georgia	Afghanistan
Gender	girl	girl	Boy	boy
Time residence	8	7	5	10
Citizenship	Norwegian	Norwegian	Norwegian 	Norwegian 

	L 1 – 2	L2 – 3 	L3 – 4/5? 	L4 – 6 	L5 – 7	L6 – 8 	L7 - 9
Religion	Muslim	Muslim	Muslim	Somalia	Muslim	Muslim	Muslim
age	17	17	17	17	17	17	16
Land	Somalia	Turkie	Kuwait	Somalia	Irak	Iran	Lebanon
Gender	Girl	Boy	Girl	Girl	Boy	Boy	Girl
Time residence				1996			
Citizenship	Danish	Danish	Danish	Danish	DANISH	DANISH	Danish

	NNK1	NNK2	NNK3	NNK4	NNK5
rel	Muslim	Muslim	Muslim	Muslim	Muslim
age	18	16	19	17	18
Country	Iran	Lebanon	??	Pakistan	Palestine/Lebanon
Gender	Girl	Boy	Boy	Girl	Boy
Time residence	18	16	19	15	18
Citizenship	Danish	Danish	Danish	Danish	DANISH

Analytical procedure
There have been several stages in the analytical procedure.  In our first reading of the interviews we experienced surprisingly little instrumental reflection among the students. On the whole they were strikingly preoccupied with norms, values and appropriate behavior. Student’s preoccupations with appropriateness lead to our focus on rationality as a key feature of political decision-making.  From our study of rationality we attempted to identity elements in political their reasoning? that may seem important and also theoretically meaningful.  Our proposed theoretical model may be considered as a dialectical interaction between reading the interviews and interpreting empirical elements. In a second stage we have tried to sort out a causal link between the elements that may be traced in he interviews and may also be theoretically meaningful.
  Empirical results
Following our suggested model for cognitive reasoning, we focus on will as a start focus on identity? and how it might relate to emotions and political rationality.  Following our model we continue to explore emotions and how these may feed political rationalities and reasoning. We end up with exploring forms of political rationalities. 
Identity
Empirically identity is a multifaceted complex matter.  There are levels like global/international, national, regional as well as number of personal aspects. One or more of these elements may be made relevant in dealing with political issues.  Among our informants, religion and belief systems as well as ethnic and national origin are important identities that are made relevant in a number of situations and forum. 
Starting with religious Islam, some very few students display sincere dedications: “As a Muslim I believe in paradise and hell. So, my goal is to come to paradise of course, and the best way to reach this goal is to act as a best possible human being in this world” (4LK1). The student explains that the Koran is the guide to life. “The best way to become the best possible person is to live according to the book and the life of its founder Mohamed. “ This particular student continues to elaborate on democracy by saying: “as a Muslim I am against systems of rule crated by humans. I prefer Sharia. A lot of people have misconceptions about Sharia ...but principally when studying Sharia you find justice in it.” By suggesting the implementation of Sharia the student emphasise that this religiously based belief system should create a new social order through the laws of Sharia.  This is the only student among our informants claiming belief in Sharia, but Islam is an important guideline to others like this young student: ..”I am a very religious Muslim and my religion is important to most of my active life.  If I need to get an answer to different issues in life I turn to my religion”(Tslk52). The student continues to explain how religious beliefs are related to politics. First of all there are issues that are particularly related to political interest and which also can be dealt with by the religious value system, but it is also complex; the student elaborates: “When it comes to politics, things like democracy and how society is supposed to work...I try to bring in religious considerations, but religion is not always given the greatest emphasis in decisions”.    What the student seems to explain is that religiously based norms and values seem to play an important role in his view of politics. Religious values seem to feed a logic of appropriateness. However, there are other considerations that are important also. When elaborating on political interest he explains.  “I think of something that can gain my interest like SU (student financial support). I do emphasize tax, economical issues that affect me.” The student explains that religious values (a value rationality) seem to be important like paying taxes and do some things to others, but instrumental rationality is also prevalent in his considerations and particularly economical issues. An important point here is what may be termed the legality discourse.  In what way is it perceived legal to participate in politics for immigrants? This student emphasise that writing articles should be neutral to avoid personal problems. When bringing in Islam which many (Danish) might be critical towards it is difficult to participate.  Also when discussing foreigners and support for poor countries these issues are controversial in a Danish audience. Tslk5s6.   What the student is saying is that his (and immigrant) political participation needs to be considered particularly carefully due to their vulnerable situation in the Danish society.  This is partly due to language difficulties, but mostly with what viewpoints are considered legal to have for immigrants. Consequently, religious value rationality needs to be carefully combined with instrumental (political contextual) considerations.   
A third Muslim student expresses similar views on religion and life: “Yes I am a practicing Muslim. Every day I think of being to others? and be a good Muslim. (Tslk6)“ When questioned whether Islam is important to her views of politics she answers; “of course it is” .  She elaborates this by telling of party choice and how her religion and immigrant identity seem to focus her political interest and political participation. However, she also voices her frustration over the media stigma and focus on Muslims as potential problems, which similar to the previous student seems to guide her feelings of politics. No doubt that media manage to evoke feelings related to values and identity. However, she also voices positive experiences with public debate in school where she feels respected despite her views.  Religious values are apparent and guide her views and the rationality. However, there are also traces of instrumentalism which may be guided by the need for protection as well as other goals in life. 
An important point about the three dedicated religious informants above is that certain issues related to religion and particularly immigrant status touch upon feelings and particular interests.  While the Muslim and immigrant identity are more stable personal elements which guide the considerations, the feelings seem to be trigger-points which leads to cognitive and other practice.  Religion seems to promote value rationality, but situational factors and personal goals and motives may call for a logic of consequentiality.   
Looking at still another Muslim student (TSlk7) he claims that he knows his religion, but is not very religious.  However, he claims that Koran equals work with prayer?, a statement which fits his emphasis on becoming a man through work at the moment. He also claims a split and uncertain national identity.  Despite weaker ties to religious and national identity he is clearly opinionated about normative views on the good citizen which should be active. He strongly emphasises that right now that he is very determined to read (in school) and work and become a man. There is a strong normative logic of appropriateness in his statements which may be influenced by religion and cultural background but not deduced from the Koran as the other Muslims. 
The logic of appropriateness is present with a strong reflective attitude. Throughout the interview he is very outgoing, reflective and claims; “I always participate in discussions.  I do try to respect others´ political viewpoints and I also claim respect for mine.” I think it is important to hear others viewpoints because I don’t learn anything if I only stick to my own beliefs.  Therefore it is always good to have conversations and hear other views.”  However, when asked about increased taxes to support poor he argues fairly instrumental to reduce taxes. “There is a limit as to how much each person should give to support others...”.The question of taxes obviously touches upon his explicit life project of becoming a man and seem to evoke his feelings (observational protocol). His reasoning instantly turns to a logic of consequentiality and becomes instrumental. With this Muslim we observe that he is much more open to the social environment and their views with much weaker ties to religion and ethnicity than the previous cases.  A value rationality is apparent, but his open mindedness and reflectivity is equally if not more prevalent.  We like to see this as a case where the important religious and national identities are claimed weaker which may promote more reflectivity and openness to society?!  Furthermore, we would like to present two other Muslims which have a more secular approach to Islam in common. 
The first one is an Iraki boy. “My religion is important and there are things that I don’t do like drinking and eating pork.  On the other hand I think Muslims overreacted in the case of Mohamed cartoons.  We could just have ignored them (the cartoons)!” He continues by saying that he is not particularly interested in politics and society, but still have some clear views on social order; “It is important that society works properly and that justice prevail. Justice is very important to me!” When asked about participation in demonstrations he replies that; yes, I could in some cases participate if there was something relevant and important, I could do this.” Such cases could be justice, repression of women or the fight against something important.  Furthermore the boy claims that he would not be persuaded to demonstrate solely for the reason of being a friend.  On the contrary, he wants to decide on participation on rational considerations.  We would like to emphasise two things here.  First when the student points out “justice and issues of importance” to him, we interpret that such cases are not only dealt with rationally, but also have at least the potential to evoke strong emotions.  Secondly, we observe that the student insists on arguing in a logic of appropriateness.  However, more instrumental motives might accompany the value logic. If our interpretations are correct we see these emotions as triggers or setting the cognitive agenda for considerations and possible actions. 
A very interesting young Muslim woman is our sole informant with formal political experience in Youth City Council.  “ I really liked to be a representative in the council because we had some influence and were able to make changes.” The student is Muslim, but not religious and do not pray regularly. The Muslim identity is still important for more practical issues in life behaviour and her resentment of Taliban associations related to Afghan identity. She claims for instance that; “In Islam it is important that you don’t destroy things and crime is forbidden which I think is good.” She also is positive to an increase of taxes to support the poor.  Furthermore she emphasise the social and political responsibility to participate in political and social affairs.  “One can not just sit there and do nothing while others decide for you!” Her feelings come to the surface when speaking of issues of particular importance! Throughout the interview her arguments are like the logic of appropriateness.  While the instrumentality is not obvious in her statements it might of course still be there. 
Muslims seem to hold a strong identity and also a belief system which may have many implications for social life.  However, other religions like the Bahia is also important: “ In Bahia it’s important to be a good model for others, follow the norms and rules.”  “My religion serves as guidelines for practice.  It is a relatively young religion and its main goal is to promote peace on earth”.  The student elaborates on how they meet and discuss and to practice according to norms and train for daily life. When it comes to participation he claims that it needs to be personally important to him to really engage actively. Once again we see that the personal affection is often a prerequisite for participation. The value logic of appropriateness is prevalent, but the personal important may of course be instrumental motives.  The reflectivity is less outspoken.
We like to draw attention to one example, a young mother of a child from Middle East, originally Muslim (16). When asked about identity she emphasises that this is her major problem, and she don’t know what to say. She explains that she is a Muslim, but not practicing and never goes go a Mosque. Nationally she comes from Middle East, but is also Norwegian and tries to understand her new social environment. She likes many things in her Middle East background, but also many aspects of Norwegian society. She elaborates walking into a church and finds “the atmosphere good to be in”. She may try to experience Christianity? She continues: “I have a very different background from here. It is very difficult to relate to all the things going on here.”  “Here is very different from where I come from.”   “It is always a problem for me how to understand the rule here, what to say and how to relate to the Norwegian social context”.  Contrary to the other Middle Eastern students, this student displays a rather uncertain identity and finds herself trapped in the uncertainty between conflicting emotions and views. “I have few personal interests in social affairs, but like to be watch news on catastrophes and particularly see how they manage”. When asked if something is personally important to her she responds; “yes, particularly on Islam and culture and things like that I’d like to hear others´ opinions.” She prefers to be reflective in a situation where sorting out different views becomes a major issue in the uncertain identity.
Emotions
We would like to focus a little more specific on the role of emotions in political engagement. When questioned about what issues are of particular salience to her – a student responds; Crime and the conditions on the farms for fur animals. (In Norway there has been strong criticism of the conditions for fur - animals on farms).  Furthermore, she likes to support the protection of polar bears, work against drunk driving and charity work. Emotions are hard to read, but is often easier to experience when listening to the interview. (ts 12), Likes, dislikes and indignations are triggers which direct attention to issues.
We have previously pointed out that interest is the pursuit of personal advantage. However, when people express political interest they may also refer to their likes and more personal involvement – their fascination with something. One the student clearly express that; “If issues interests me I may participate, if not, I will not get involved” ts13.  The student elaborates on personal interests in a way that may involve interest as a pursuit of advantage.  However, we are inclined to think that “interest” also involves an emotional part of liking and disliking as well as other emotional aspects.  We therefore believe that when students voice their personal interest, they also display emotions of their more general personal involvement.  This is important because we believe that these emotions guide students to further readings, participation of some kind or personal reflections. Emotions therefore may become mechanisms in political action. 
For many students the Israeli/Palestine conflict is a source of emotions and political engagement. A Vietnamese student explain; “I remember participating in a demonstration about Gaza”.  “I felt like supporting students from this origin”.  The student claims that he is not particularly interested in the Middle-East countries, but that Gaza is special which involve people he knows. Furthermore he elaborates:  “I need to be personally involved to get the extra kick to for participation”TS14.11.  We believe that this student points (among other things) to his emotional involvement as decisive for his political participation. The emotional precondition is quite clear in our last example.  The student was asked about how important personal involvement is for her decision to participate.  She responds; “If I go to town and I find something annoying to me, or if I don’t like something I walk over and tell people that it is not right”. “So if thing really matter to me I tend to take action”. We believe that this statement display the role of emotions in political action for many.  Some degree of emotional involvement tends to direct attentions, fuel interest and sometimes be the trigger of political participation. 
Discussion and tentative conclusion
We have so far tried to show how students´ perceived identities have consequences for how they view and anticipate their political involvement. We have discussed how rationalities combine information, identities and emotions in decisions about political involvement.  Finally we have shown that particularly emotions tend to direct and be a trigger when individuals decide to participate. All in all we have presented some empirical support for our model.  However, we like to discuss how such a model might be understood.
First of all, we have only focused on a particularly important religious identity.  A variety of identities might be made relevant in political situations. The students also display strong and weak identities which have quite different consequences for how they perceive and relate to politics.  Regardless of which identity and the strength of a particular identity we believe that how people see themselves with respect to their identities nearly always matter in their political life. Particularly we have shown that varying strength in religious identity seems to matter for political reasoning, particularly forms of rationality.  It seems that strong religious believes tend to promote logic of appropriateness and less a logic of consequentiality.  While issues pop up all the time, identities are somewhat stable and may be a basis for political orientation, information-seeking and rationalities.  
As displayed in our empirical analysis, forms of rationalities are difficult to capture. In the logic of appropriateness, there might be instrumental motives which empirically are hard to uncover. Despite this uncertainty our informants have been using the logic of appropriateness much more than instrumental rationality in their explicit statements. Sometimes the logic of appropriateness is combined with reflexivity.   
Furthermore we have displayed some support for emotions as vital part of the model of political reasoning. Emotions direct attention to information and to issues of particular salience to a person. Emotions are triggers and sometimes make people take action in their life. Emotions are closely related to identities in a two way relationship. We argue that emotions should be part of our model because it often plays such a decisive role in political reasoning. However, some people are labeled “emotional” and some people are labeled cool or calm (less emotional).  Still we argue that emotions play a role in political reasoning and orientation for most people.
A tentative conclusion to this discussion is therefore that the model presented is supported empirically.  The elements in the model play quite different role for individuals, but should still be considered.
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